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The present research investigated how individual differences in
Extraversion and Agreeableness affect cooperation in an experi-
mental resource dilemma. Manipulated feedback indicated
either that the common resource was being used at a sustainable
rate or that it was being rapidly depleted. As predicted,
Extraversion was generally negatively related to cooperation,
whereas Agreeableness was generally positively related to cooper-
ation. Whereas individuals high in Extraversion and individu-
als low in Agreeableness were unresponsive to feedback regarding
collective resource use, individuals low in Extraversion and
individuals high in Agreeableness exercised more self-restraint
when the common resource was severely threatened. Exploratory
analyses revealed neither interactive effects of Extraversion and
Agreeableness nor effects of individual differences in Conscien-
tiousness, Emotional Stability, and Intellect. Together, these
results highlight the importance of individual differences in
Extraversion and Agreeableness in social dilemma settings.
Overcoming one’s personal limitations often can be
accomplished by cooperating with others. Through
coordinated efforts, a group may outdo even the most
spectacularly talented individual acting alone. The social
group can thus provide a powerful buffer against the
demands of the physical environment (Brewer, in press;
Buss, 1991b; Leaky, 1978; Simon, 1990). However, to
reap the rewards of interindividual cooperation, individ-
ual group members frequently have to make personal
sacrifices. A classic example is Hardin’s (1968) tragedy
of the commons, in which each herdsman profits from
keeping as many cattle as possible on a common pasture
but all herdsmen face ruin from overgrazing if they add
too many animals to the common land. In such cases,
individual group members are faced with the social
dilemma of choosing between their personal interests
and the collective interests of their social group (Dawes,
1980; Komorita & Parks, 1995; Messick & Brewer, 1983;
Van Lange, Liebrand, Messick, & Wilke, 1993).
The capacity for cooperation is probably present
within every human being. Nonetheless, the strength of
that capacity may vary across situations and persons. The
social dilemma literature has successfully identified a
number of situational variables that may elicit or under-
mine cooperative behavior (for reviews, see Komorita &
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Parks, 1995; Messick & Brewer, 1983; Van Lange et al.,
1993). One important situational variable is the behav-
ior of other group members. Although the influence of
others’ behavior may be moderated by many other vari-
ables, one consistent finding is that people often recipro-
cate the level of cooperativeness displayed by others
(e.g., Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; McClintock & Liebrand,
1988; Rubin & Brown, 1975; Wyer, 1969). Unfortunately,
research has remained inconclusive regarding the role
of personality in social dilemmas (for reviews, see Rubin &
Brown, 1975; Terhune, 1970; Thompson, 1990). The
failure to find consistent personality effects has led some
researchers in the field to question the importance of
personality characteristics as determinants of social con-
flict behavior (e.g., Davis-Blake & Pfeffer, 1989; Lewicki,
Litterer, Minton, & Saunders, 1994; Worchel, 1986).
However, it seems premature to conclude that person-
ality plays no significant role in social dilemmas. On a
theoretical level, psychoevolutionary models suggest
that environmental pressures may give rise to individual
differences in levels of cooperativeness (Buss, 1997;
Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997; Hogan, 1982; Tooby &
Cosmides, 1990). In particular, different individuals may
be confronted with environments that differ in the adap-
tiveness of cooperative behavior. For example, individu-
als raised in large families as opposed to individuals
raised in small families may more frequently encounter
situations in which resources have to be shared (Van
Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997). As a result
of such recurrently different environmental pressures,
stable individual differences may develop in preferred
behavioral strategies in interdependent situations (Buss,
1997; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). Empirically, critics have
pointed out numerous shortcomings in previous
research into the influence of personality characteristics
in social dilemmas, such as unresolved trait measure-
ment issues, insufficiently rich and complex social
dilemma simulations, and a neglect of situational mod-
erators (e.g., Nemeth, 1972; Terhune, 1970; Thompson,
1990).
THE SEARCH FOR A GENERAL TAXONOMY
OF INTERPERSONAL PERSONALITY TRAITS
One of the most important obstacles in the study of
personality in social interaction has been a lack of con-
sensus on how personality should be defined and mea-
sured. Some researchers have attempted to circumvent
this problem by inferring the dispositional variable of
cooperativeness from different patterns of behavioral
choices (e.g., Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975; Liebrand &
Van Run, 1985; Messick & McClintock, 1968; Van Lange &
Kuhlman, 1994). Although such a behavioral approach
avoids many problematic issues relating to measurement
and definition that have plagued conventional personal-
ity constructs, it also has important limitations. First, the
behavioral approach does not provide a common con-
ceptual language that specifies the relations between
behavioral measures of interpersonal dispositions and
other personality constructs. This language barrier
makes it difficult to integrate findings from different
areas, impeding the accumulation of scientific findings.
Second, it remains unclear to what extent behavioral
measures are able to gauge cross-situational dispositions.
Some studies indicate that the predictive validity of
behavioral measures can vary considerably depending
on their particular format (Parks, 1994). Moreover,
behavioral decisions may be influenced by even very sub-
tle situational cues (Hertel & Fiedler, 1998; Neuberg,
1988), which may further undermine the ability of
behavioral measures to tap into cross-situational disposi-
tions. In light of these considerations, it seems desirable
to arrive at a generic conceptual framework of interper-
sonal dispositions that encompasses both behavioral and
conventional personality approaches.
Fortunately, researchers have recently made impor-
tant advances toward establishing such a general frame-
work of interpersonal dispositions. Over the last two
decades, personality researchers have reached a consen-
sus that the domain of interpersonal traits can be ade-
quately described by two dimensions1 (e.g., De Raad,
1995; McCrae & Costa, 1989; Trapnell & Wiggins, 1990).
Evidence for this taxonomic framework stems from two
independent lines of research. The first originates in
social-clinical psychology (Freedman, Leary, Ossorio, &
Coffey, 1951; see Trapnell & Wiggins, 1990), in which the
two dimensions have been labeled Dominance and
Nurturance (e.g., Wiggins, 1979, 1980). The second line
of research originates in the lexical/factor-analytic tradi-
tion (e.g., De Raad, 1995; McCrae & Costa, 1989), in which
the two dimensions have been labeled Extraversion and
Agreeableness. The different labels reflect somewhat
differing locations of the two defining axes in the inter-
personal trait domain: The Dominance-Nurturance
axes were located on theoretical grounds, whereas the
Extraversion-Agreeableness dimensions were located by
means of factor-analytic procedures (see De Raad, 1995;
Hofstee, De Raad, & Goldberg, 1992; McCrae & Costa,
1989; Trapnell & Wiggins, 1990). The Extraversion-
Agreeableness framework is part of a five-factor taxon-
omy that has gained considerable support in the field of
personality (Hofstee et al., 1992; John, Angleitner, &
Ostendorf, 1988; McCrae & John, 1992). Moreover, the
Extraversion-Agreeableness framework is increasingly
used in the social psychological research (e.g., Barry &
Friedman, 1998; Buss, 1991a, 1992; Caldwell & Burger,
1997; David & Suls, 1999; Graziano, Hair, & Finch,
1997; Graziano, Jensen-Campbell, & Hair, 1996; Suls,
Martin, & David, 1998). We therefore use the labels of
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Extraversion, which is associated with being sociable,
talkative, and active, and Agreeableness, which is associ-
ated with being trusting, cooperative, and tolerant. It
may be noted that, empirically, Extraversion-Dominance
and Agreeableness-Nurturance correlations are often in
the .60s and higher (e.g., De Raad, 1995; Trapnell &
Wiggins, 1990).
As a taxonomy of interpersonal personality character-
istics, the Extraversion-Agreeableness framework offers
important advantages to the study of personality in social
interaction. First, the taxonomy may serve as an integra-
tive framework for previous work in the field because
every personality trait that is intrinsically interpersonal
can be expected to fall within the two-dimensional trait
domain that comprises Extraversion and Agreeableness
(De Raad, 1995; McCrae & Costa, 1989; Trapnell &
Wiggins, 1990). Thus, the framework permits research-
ers to go beyond isolated traits to examine empirical reg-
ularities across a broad range of personality constructs.
Second, Extraversion and Agreeableness refer to rela-
tively decontextualized dimensions of personality. Con-
sequently, individual differences in Extraversion and
Agreeableness can be expected to relate to behavioral
tendencies across a wide range of interpersonal settings.
Third, factor-analytic evidence indicates that
Extraversion and Agreeableness are among the most
reliable personality dimensions to emerge across differ-
ent cultures and language domains (e.g., Digman &
Takemoto-Chock, 1981; Hofstee et al., 1992; John et al.,
1988; McCrae & Costa, 1987; Trapnell & Wiggins, 1990).
This enables researchers to examine empirical regulari-
ties that exist across different cultures. In sum, the
Extraversion-Agreeableness framework promises to be a
suitable starting point for the analysis of the role of per-
sonality in interpersonal interaction, particularly in
social dilemmas.
EFFECTS OF EXTRAVERSION AND
AGREEABLENESS ON COOPERATION
Few studies have systematically examined the role of
Extraversion and Agreeableness in interpersonal con-
flict. Moreover, Extraversion and Agreeableness have
mostly been studied separately. In one study involving
hypothetical scenarios of conflict situations, Norman
and Watson (1976) found that individuals low on
Extraversion rated interpersonal conflicts as more
aversive than did individuals high on Extraversion.
These results were replicated by Graziano, Bernstein-
Feldesman, and Rahe (1985), who speculated that intro-
verts may be more motivated to avoid the arousal associ-
ated with competitive situations. Thus, it appears that
individuals low on Extraversion are more inclined
toward cooperation than are individuals high on
Extraversion, because people who cooperate are more
likely to avoid interpersonal conflict (e.g., Kelley &
Stahelski, 1970). Consistent with this notion, Bem and
Lord (1979) found that individuals classified as coopera-
tors were described by their roommates as introverted,
whereas individuals classified as noncooperators were
consistently described as extraverted. In sum, the avail-
able evidence suggests that individuals low on
Extraversion are more inclined to behave cooperatively
than are individuals high on Extraversion. This may
seem at odds with the popular meaning of the trait
“extraverted,” which has “friendly” connotations as
well (Hofstee et al., 1992). Within the Extraversion-
Agreeableness framework, however, friendly connota-
tions of Extraversion are entirely subsumed under the
Agreeableness dimension; therefore, this contradiction
is more apparent than real.
Theoretically, Agreeableness has been related to a
motivation to maintain positive relations with others.
Some authors have linked this motivation to an evolved
willingness to suspend one’s individual interests for the
good of one’s social group (Buss, 1991b; Digman &
Takemoto-Chock, 1981; Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997). A
set of recent studies has subjected the supposed link
between Agreeableness and cooperative behavior to
empirical testing. In a study of manipulation tactics in
intimate relationships, Buss (1992) found that individu-
als high on Agreeableness used more constructive con-
flict resolution strategies, such as pleasure induction and
reason, than did individuals low on Agreeableness.
Moreover, individuals high on Agreeableness were less
likely to use coercive conflict resolution strategies than
were individuals low on Agreeableness. In another study,
individuals low on Agreeableness were found to be less
considerate to their marriage partners than were individ-
uals high on Agreeableness (Buss, 1991a). In a related
vein, Graziano et al. (1996) reported two studies in
which individuals high on Agreeableness displayed
stronger preferences for constructive conflict resolution
strategies over power assertion tactics compared to indi-
viduals low on Agreeableness. Graziano et al. (1997)
replicated and extended these findings by showing that
individuals high on Agreeableness behaved less compet-
itively during a group task compared with individuals low
on Agreeableness. Overall, the available evidence sug-
gests that individuals high on Agreeableness are gener-
ally more inclined to behave cooperatively than are indi-
viduals low on Agreeableness.
THE PRESENT RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES
The present research investigated how individual dif-
ferences in Extraversion and Agreeableness affect coop-
eration in a social dilemma setting. Our earlier discus-
sion suggested that individuals low on Extraversion are
more averse to competitive situations than are individu-
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als high on Extraversion. Because cooperation often is
reciprocated by others (e.g., Kelley & Stahelski, 1970),
one way to avoid interpersonal conflict is to display
highly cooperative behavior. Accordingly, we expected
individuals low on Extraversion to be generally more
cooperative than individuals high on Extraversion
(Bem & Lord, 1979; Graziano et al., 1985; Norman &
Watson, 1976). The foregoing discussion also indicated
that individuals high on Agreeableness are more
inclined to care about the collective interests of their
social group. Consequently, we expected individuals
high on Agreeableness to be generally more cooperative
than individuals low on Agreeableness (Buss, 1991a,
1992; Graziano et al., 1996, 1997).
Previous work on the role of personality in social
interaction has been criticized for an underemphasis of
the role of situations (Buss, 1987; Rubin & Brown, 1975;
Terhune, 1970; Thompson, 1990). To overcome this lim-
itation, the present research employed a resource
dilemma paradigm in which individuals made consecu-
tive decisions as to how much to take from a collective
resource that was replenished at a fixed rate (e.g.,
Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Liebrand, 1984). Thus, we
could examine the influence of Extraversion and Agree-
ableness during repeated interactions. During these
interactions, we supplied participants with manipulated
feedback about collective resource use so that we could
study how personality characteristics interacted with per-
ceived level of threat to the collective resource.
Primarily self-interested individuals tend to believe
that noncooperation is the strongest and most intelli-
gent strategy in social dilemmas (Van Lange & Kuhlman,
1994). In addition, self-interested individuals typically
display low levels of cooperative behavior, showing a ten-
dency to exploit other group members’ cooperative
behavior whenever it occurs (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970;
McClintock & Liebrand, 1988). Consequently, individu-
als high on Extraversion and individuals low on Agree-
ableness were expected to display low levels of coopera-
tion (i.e., high resource use) independent of feedback
about other group members’ behavior. In contrast,
cooperatively oriented individuals are known to be
responsive to the level of cooperation by other group
members. Although cooperatively oriented individuals
are concerned with outcomes associated with mutual
cooperation, they often react to exploitation by behav-
ing noncooperatively (e.g., Kelley & Stahelski, 1970;
Kramer, McClintock, & Messick, 1986). Consequently,
individuals low on Extraversion and individuals high on
Agreeableness were expected to reciprocate the level of
cooperation by other group members. In response to
cooperative group members, individuals low on
Extraversion and individuals high on Agreeableness
were expected to behave more cooperatively, whereas in
response to noncooperative group members they were
expected to behave less cooperatively.
In the resource dilemma under study, preservation of
the collective resource was partly determined by the con-
sumption patterns of the individual group members. As
long as the collective resource was not under risk of
being depleted, there was little pressure on individuals
to reduce their consumption to preserve the collective
resource. This low-threat situation occurred when col-
lective consumption took place at a sustainable rate or at
the early stages of collective overconsumption. However,
when the collective resource continued to be overused,
the risk of its extinction would become more and more
apparent. We suspected that this would increase the con-
cerns to preserve the collective resource among cooper-
atively oriented individuals (see Kramer et al., 1986, for a
similar argument). Thus, individuals low on Extraversion
and individuals high on Agreeableness were expected to
reciprocate collective overuse but only as long as the col-
lective resource was not under risk of depletion. When
collective overuse continued to the point of imminent de-
pletion, individuals low on Extraversion and individuals
high on Agreeablenessan might switch to lower levels of
resource use to avert depletion of the collective resource.
Consistent with psychometric evidence (e.g., Trapnell &
Wiggins, 1990), and experimental evidence regarding
the differential motivational underpinnings of
Extraversion and Agreeableness (e.g., Graziano et al.,
1985, 1997), we regard Extraversion and Agreeableness
as two orthogonal determinants of interpersonal behav-
ior. Consequently, we expected to find negligible corre-
lations between these two constructs. In addition, the
predicted effects of each dimension should remain reli-
able after controlling for each other’s influence. The
conceptual independence of Extraversion and Agree-
ableness further opens up the possibility that these per-
sonality dimensions interact with each other to predict
cooperative behavior. For instance, individuals low on
Extraversion and high on Agreeableness might be espe-
cially prone to being cooperative. Although it is unclear
whether this would occur over and above the additive
effects of Extraversion and Agreeableness, this possibil-
ity seemed of sufficient interest to merit further explora-
tion in the present research.
Finally, the present research explored the influence
of three other broad personality dimensions: Conscien-
tiousness, Emotional Stability, and Intellect. These three
broad personality dimensions were considered poten-
tially important because they, together with Extraversion
and Agreeableness, are among the five most robust per-
sonality dimensions to have surfaced in a large number
of factor-analytic studies (see Digman, 1990; John et al.,
1988; Ozer & Reise, 1994). Although these three person-
ality dimensions are not intrinsically interpersonal,
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some authors have speculated that they may still have
important interpersonal consequences (cf. McCrae &
Costa, 1989). Thus, it seemed worthwhile to see whether
individual differences in Conscientiousness, Emotional
Stability, and Intellect can account for variance in coop-
erative behavior that cannot be explained by individual
differences in Extraversion and Agreeableness.
METHOD
Overview and Design
The present study employed a computerized
resource dilemma paradigm (e.g., Brewer & Kramer,
1986; Kramer et al., 1986; Liebrand, 1984; Parks, 1994).
Each participant shared access to a common pool of
resources with seven (simulated) others. Experimental
feedback indicated either that the common resource was
being collectively sustained or that it was being collec-
tively overused. Each simulation was interrupted after
participants had made 12 consecutive resource use deci-
sions. The primary independent variables were partici-
pants’ Extraversion and Agreeableness scores and feed-
back about resource use (sustained use vs. rapid
depletion). The main dependent variable was each par-
ticipant’s resource use throughout the resource
dilemma simulation.
Participants
A total of 72 first-year psychology students at the Uni-
versity of Groningen (in the Netherlands) participated
in the experiment. Participants were informed that the
investigation comprised a computerized decision game
and that each participant would have a chance of win-
ning a compact disc (CD) player (or its monetary equiva-
lent) or a CD voucher worth 50 guilders (about
U.S.$30).
Personality Measurement
As part of a personality research program, 1st-year stu-
dents of psychology received a mailing in which they
were invited to participate in a personality study. All
questionnaires were mailed. In an accompanying letter,
participants were asked not to discuss their ratings with
others. In return for their participation, targets received
feedback about their personality profiles. The feedback
was given after the experimental data had been collected.2
Participants completed a list of 225 personality-
descriptive adjectives that were selected to represent the
entire domain of Dutch trait descriptors (cf. Hendriks,
1997). Ratings on the trait-adjective rating list were made
on scales ranging from 1 (much less than others) to 5 (much
more than others). Scores on Extraversion, Agreeableness,
Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and Intellect
were calculated by multiplying each participant’s item
ratings by the factor weights of each item for the respec-
tive personality dimensions. These factor weights were
determined by factor analyzing item ratings from a
larger pool of participants (N = 790; this pool included
the sample that participated in the present study). This
factor analysis yielded five interpretable factors corre-
sponding to the Dutch Big Five personality dimensions
(Hofstee et al., 1992). The first two factors were labeled
Extraversion and Agreeableness, the remaining three
were labeled Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability,
and Intellect (see Hendriks, 1997, for a more detailed
description).
Procedure
The experiment was conducted in a laboratory con-
taining eight Apple Macintosh computers located in sep-
arate cubicles and a central computer. After arriving at
the laboratory, participants were met by an experi-
menter who led them to their separate cubicles. The
remainder of the experiment was administered via a
computer program.
Resource Dilemma Simulation
After being familiarized with the computer, partici-
pants proceeded with the resource dilemma simulation.
Participants were told that the research involved a decision-
making game. This game was to be played with 7 other
participants who were in the adjacent cubicles and were
ostensibly linked together via the central computer.
Each participant was told that she or he, together with
the others, shared access to a common resource pool.
The common pool initially contained 400 points, visual-
ized by means of a bar chart on the computer screen. On
each game trial, participants could take between 0 and
10 points for themselves. After each participant had indi-
cated the number of points she or he wanted to take, the
common resources would be replenished with 10% of
the number of points that remained in the common
pool after the total number of points had been
subtracted.
During the next trial, participants could again with-
draw points from the common pool. Participants were
told that they could continue to accumulate points for as
long as the common pool was not empty. The total num-
ber of points that participants accumulated for them-
selves would determine their odds in the lottery that
would take place after the experiment. To maximize
their chances of winning a CD player or a CD voucher
(or their monetary equivalent), each participant should
try to accumulate as many points as possible. It was
pointed out that the number of points that each partici-
pant could collect depended on both the number of
points he or she would take per trial and the number of
rounds that the game would be played. No indication
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was given as to the best strategy or the number of trials
that the game would be played.
At the end of each trial, participants received feed-
back regarding the choices made by the players and a bar
chart representing the current level of the common
resource. Because each player was referred to by a color
code, each player remained anonymous. Feedback
about the other players’ choices and the level of the com-
mon resource was manipulated. Feedback about partici-
pants’ own choices was genuine and was supplied to
strengthen the impression that the feedback was truth-
ful. The resource dilemma simulation continued for 12
trials and was subsequently interrupted by a series of
postexperimental questions. Next, participants were
debriefed and thanked for their participation. Two
weeks after the experiment, it was announced which par-
ticipants could collect their prizes at the psychology
department.
Feedback About Resource Use
In the sustained use condition, feedback indicated
that the group was using the resource at a rate that
allowed the common resource to sustain itself through
replenishment after each round. During the 12 trials of
the simulation, graphical feedback indicated that the
level of the common resource fluctuated between 400
and 375 points. Feedback about individual resource use
indicated that one player (the high user) withdrew rela-
tively many points per trial (M = 8.5 per trial). Another
player (the low user) withdrew relatively few points for
himself or herself per trial (M = 3.4 per trial). The other
players withdrew intermediate amounts (M = 4.5 per
trial).
In the rapid depletion condition, feedback indicated
that the group was using the resource at a rate that did
not allow the common resource to sustain itself through
replenishment. During the 12 rounds, graphical feed-
back indicated that the level of the common resource
dropped from 400 to about 40 points (the common pool
was not completely depleted at the last trial). Feedback
about individual resource use indicated that the high
user withdrew on average 9.3 points per trial, the low
user withdrew on average 4.7 points per trial, and the




As a manipulation check, participants were asked to
estimate the average number of points the other players
harvested during the 12 trials. Estimated average
resource use by the other players was significantly higher
in the rapid depletion than in the sustainable use condi-
tion (M = 5.24 vs. M = 4.24, p < .001). Thus, the feedback
manipulation appeared to have been successful in influ-
encing perceptions of collective resource use.
Relationship Between
Extraversion and Agreeableness
The correlation between Extraversion and Agreeable-
ness was small and unreliable (r = –.14, ns). Thus, our fac-
tor analysis procedures appear to have succeeded in
orthogonalizing the personality dimensions relating to
Extraversion and Agreeableness. The statistical in-
dependence of Extraversion and Agreeableness is desir-
able because it allows the current research to test
whether Extraversion and Agreeableness independently
contribute to predicting resource use behavior.
Resource Use
Participants’ resource use decisions have a multilevel
structure because each resource use decision can be con-
sidered a lower level observation nested under the upper
level unit, persons. Taking this data structure into
account, we analyzed the data using multilevel analysis
(MLwiN) (Goldstein et al., 1998), which treats both
lower and upper level units as sampling units so that
inferences can be made to both observations and per-
sons (Bryk & Raudenbusch, 1992; see David & Suls, 1999;
Suls et al., 1998, for applications in personality
research). Following this approach, patterns of resource
use across the different stages of the resource dilemma
simulation were calculated separately for each partici-
pant. In subsequent steps, the variability of the estimated
parameters (i.e., slopes and intercepts) of the individual
coefficients was modeled with between-group variables
(feedback condition), individual attributes (e.g.,
Extraversion and Agreeableness), and their interaction
terms.
Within-Person Model
We began by setting up a model at the within-subject
level. This can be formulated as fitting a model for a pop-
ulation of curves (Snijders, in press). As a first step, we fit
the mean curve in resource use decisions exactly.
Because there are 12 resource use decisions, this can be
done by using an 11th- degree polynomial. This fully sat-
urated model is comparable with a conventional
MANOVA with repeated measures. Formally, the model
can be characterized by the population mean curve,
given by
Resource Usetj = a0j + a1jTrialtj
+ a2jTrial2tj +  . . .  + a11jTrial11tj (1)
where Resource Usetj represents resource use at Trial t by
individuals j, a0j is the intercept, and a1j to a11j represent
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the slopes of the curves. Note that there is no random re-
sidual in the within-person model because the model is
fully saturated.
An equivalent approach is to use dummy variables.
We chose the latter option because the MLwiN software
does not allow for computation of an orthogonalized set
of polynomials. It should be kept in mind that whether
one uses 11 dummy variables or an 11th-degree poly-
nomial is just a matter of parametrization and not a dif-
ference between two statistical models (cf. Snijders, in
press). Resource use during the first trial of the resource
dilemma was used as the reference level of resource use,
and separate dummy variables were used in the random
part of the model. Formally, the model can be character-
ized as follows:
Resource Usetj = u1jConstanttj
+ u2jTrial2tj +  . . .  + u12jTrial12tj (2)
where Resource Uset represents resource use at Trial t by
individuals j, u1j is average resource use at Trial 1, and u2j
to u12j represent average resource use at Trials 2 to 12.
Again, there is no random residual in the within-person
model because the model is fully saturated.
The goodness of fit of this model was indicated by a
deviance of 2851.35. Average resource use per trial fluc-
tuated between 5.51 and 6.23. Estimated variances in
resource use per trial were significant (ranging from
2.88 to 4.33). In addition, estimated variances in
resource use per trial tended to increase as the simula-
tion progressed (from 3.34 in the first trial to 4.33 in the
last trial). Significant covariances among resource use
during the different trials indicated that there was con-
siderable consistency in levels of resource use within
individuals (interested readers may contact the first
author for more details regarding this analysis). Because
the main variables of interest were between-person
effects, the remainder of this section will concentrate on
the between-person model.
Between-Person Model
The second, between-subject level of the model
describes the degree to which manipulated feedback
regarding collective resource use and personality char-
acteristics can account for variability in the temporal pat-
terns of participants’ resource use. Our modeling was
restricted to linear and quadratic patterns in resource
use because mathematically more complex trends were
not considered theoretically meaningful. Consequently,
the between-subject model has three parts, referring to
the effects of manipulated feedback and personality
characteristics on intercept differences in resource use,
linear trends in resource use, and quadratic trends in
resource use. The model of intercept differences in
resource use was as follows:
a0j = β0 + β1FBj + β2Ej + β3Aj + β4FB*Ej + β5FB*Aj + s0j (3)
where a0j represents overall between-subject differences
in resource use, the intercept β0 represents the expected
level of average resource use in the sustained use condi-
tion for a person whose Extraversion and Agreeableness
are average, the slope β1 indicates whether differential
feedback (FBj) regarding the level of collective resource
use caused significant variation in resource use (0 = sus-
tained use, 1 = rapid depletion), the slope β2 indicates
whether individual differences in Extraversion (Ej) ac-
counted for significant variation in resource use, the
slope β3 indicates whether individual differences in
Agreeableness (Aj) accounted for significant variation
in resource use, the slope β4 indicates whether the inter-
action between feedback and Extraversion (FB*Ej) ac-
counted for significant variation in resource use, the
slope β5 indicates whether the interaction between feed-
back and Agreeableness (FB*Aj) accounted for signifi-
cant variation in resource use, and s0j is random residual
variance in between-subject differences in resource use.
The second and third parts of the between-subject
model are similar except that feedback and individual
differences in Extraversion and Agreeableness are used
as potential predictors of variations in the linear (a1j) and
quadratic (a2j) trends in resource use:
a1j = β6 + β7FBj + β8Ej + β9Aj + β10FB*Ej + β11FB*Aj + s1j (4)
a2j = β12 + β13FBj + β14Ej + β15Aj + β16FB*Ej + β17FB*Aj + s2j (5)
Complete Model
Recall that dummy variables were used for each trial in
the within-person model but not in the between-person
model. The complete model thus formed a hybrid of the
within-person model described in Formula 2 and the
between-person model described in Formulas 3-5.
Stated formally,
Resource Usetj =
β0 + β1FBj + β2Ej + β3Aj + β4FBEj + β5FBAj + β6Trialtj
+ β7Trial*FBtj + β8Trial*Etj + β9Trial*Atj + β10Trial*FB*Etj
+ β11Trial*FB*Atj + β12Trial2tj + β13Trial2*FBtj + β14Trial2*Etj
+ β15Trial2*Atj + β16Trial2*FB*Etj + β17Trial2*FB*Atj
+ u1jConstanttj + u2jTrial2tj +  . . .  + u12jTrial12tj (6)
where β0 indicates the expected level of average resource
use in the sustained use condition for a person whose
Extraversion and Agreeableness are average and β1 to β17
represent the slopes of the main effects of feedback, the
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linear and quadratic trends in resource use, individual
differences in Extraversion and Agreeableness, and
their interactions. These effects together constituted the
fixed part of the model. The remainder of the model
consisted of the random effects for trial, represented by
a constant and 11 dummy variables.
To facilitate comparison of effect sizes, all predictor
variables were standardized by multiplying regression
coefficients with SD(x)/SD(y). Univariate effects (fixed
and random) can be tested by dividing them by their
standard error. The resulting quantity is approximately
normally distributed. Multivariate effects of predictors
can be tested by computing the increase in goodness of
fit after including a set of predictors, represented by a
decrease in deviance. The resulting quantity follows a
chi-square distribution, with the number of added pre-
dictors as degrees of freedom. The decrease in model
deviance also provides an indication of the variance
explained by the added predictors.
Overall Variations in Resource Use
First, linear and quadratic trends in resource use were
estimated. The resulting decrease in model deviance was
significant, χ2(2) = 8.73, p < .02. Univariate tests revealed
that there was a small but reliable linear trend across tri-
als, β = .05, z = 1.85, p < .05, indicating that there was a
slight increase in resource use with each trial. In addi-
tion, there was a significant quadratic trend, β = –.19, z =
1.85, p < .05, indicating that resource use tended to
increase during the first trials of the simulation and
tended to decrease during the final trials of the
simulation.
Effects of Feedback About
Collective Resource Use
Next, the main effect of feedback and the Feedback ×
Trial interactions were added to the model. The result-
ing decrease in model deviance was marginally signifi-
cant, χ2(3) = 6.28, p < .10. The univariate interaction
between feedback and the quadratic trend in resource
use was significant, β = –.21, z = 2.12, p < .05, indicating
that the quadratic trend in resource use only occurred in
the rapid depletion condition. Thus, the decrease in
resource use during the final trials of the simulation was




After this, effects of Extraversion and Agreeableness
and their interactions with trial block and feedback were
estimated and tested in a hierarchical fashion. During
the first step, main effects of Extraversion and Agree-
ableness were added to the model. After this, two-way
interaction effects of Extraversion and Agreeableness
with trial and feedback were added. The final step
involved adding the three-way interactions between
Extraversion and Agreeableness and trial and feedback.
The resulting model deviance was 2804.14, which repre-
sented a highly significant decrease compared to the
model without Extraversion and Agreeableness predic-
tors, χ2(12) = 32.20, p < .002.
As expected, participants high on Extraversion har-
vested more from the common resource than did partici-
pants low in Extraversion, β = .13, z = 1.71, p < .05. This
main effect, however, was qualified by the predicted
three-way interaction between Extraversion, feedback,
and the quadratic trend, β = .35, z = 3.54, p < .001. This
interaction is graphically displayed in Figure 1. Further
tests revealed that, in the sustained-use condition, partic-
ipants high on Extraversion harvested more from the
common resource than did participants low on
Extraversion, β = .23, z = 2.29, p < .05. In the rapid deple-
tion condition, there was a significant interaction
between Extraversion and the quadratic trend, β = .51, z =
3.75, p < .001. Under rapid depletion, participants high
on Extraversion remained fairly constant in their
resource use. In contrast, participants low in
Extraversion tended to raise their resource use to the
level of participants low on Extraversion during the first
half of the simulation. During the second half of the sim-
ulation, however, participants low on Extraversion
showed a strong decrease in their resource use.
As expected, participants high in Agreeableness har-
vested less from the common resource than did partici-
pants low on Agreeableness, β = –.25, z = 3.22, p < .001.
This main effect, however, was qualified by the predicted
three-way interaction between Agreeableness, feedback,
and the linear trend, β = –.11, z = 1.87, p < .05. This interac-
tion is graphically displayed in Figure 2. In the sustained-
use condition, participants high on Agreeableness
harvested less from the common resource than did par-
ticipants low on Agreeableness, β = –.32, z = 3.61, p < .001.
In the rapid-depletion condition, there was a significant
interaction between Agreeableness and trial, indicating
that participants high on Agreeableness harvested less
with each trial, whereas harvesting by participants low on
Agreeableness remained high throughout the simula-
tion. A marginally significant three-way interaction
between Agreeableness, feedback, and the quadratic
trend indicated that this effect was most apparent during
the later trials of the simulation, β = –.13, z = 1.40, p < .10.
Exploratory Analyses
After testing the primary hypotheses concerning
Extraversion and Agreeableness, a series of exploratory
analyses was conducted to examine whether the inter-
action between Extraversion and Agreeableness pre-
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dicted variance in resource use over and above the addi-
tive effects of Extraversion and Agreeableness. In these
analyses, estimations were made of the two-way interac-
tion between Extraversion and Agreeableness and the
three-way interactions between Extraversion, Agree-
ableness, and trial and Extraversion, Agreeableness,
and feedback. These analyses revealed no significant
multivariate or univariate effects.
A second set of exploratory analyses was run to see
whether individual differences in Conscientiousness,
Emotional Stability, and Intellect were able to account
for additional variance in resource use. In these analy-
ses, the model including all effects involving trial, feed-
back, Extraversion, and Agreeableness acted as a base-
line. Only main effects of Conscientiousness,
Emotional Stability, and Intellect and their respective
two-way interactions with trial and feedback were
tested. The results of these analyses revealed no statisti-
cally reliable multivariate effects of the three personal-
ity dimensions. In addition, a series of univariate analy-
ses testing the main effects of Emotional Stability and
Intellect and their two-way interactions involving trial
and feedback revealed no more significant effects than
would be expected to occur by chance (only 1 out of 18
tests was significant at the .05 level).
DISCUSSION
The present findings highlight the interpersonal
nature of individual differences in Extraversion and
Agreeableness. It was found that (a) global personality
differences in Extraversion and Agreeableness were
linked to cooperation in a resource dilemma; (b) the
link between Extraversion and Agreeableness and
cooperation was moderated by situational variables,
that is, level of collective cooperation and severity of
threat to the collective resource; and (c) Conscientious-
ness, Emotional Stability, and Intellect, three personal-
ity dimensions hypothesized to be not intrinsically
interpersonal (McCrae & Costa, 1987), did not affect
cooperative behavior. Taken together, these findings
contribute to the accumulating support for the validity
of the Extraversion-Agreeableness dimensions as an
integrative framework for the study of interpersonal
personality traits (e.g., Barry & Friedman, 1998; De
Raad, 1995; Graziano et al., 1985; Graziano &
Eisenberg, 1997; Graziano et al., 1997; McCrae & Costa,
1989; Trapnell & Wiggins, 1990).
The present findings demonstrate that global,
decontextualized ratings of Extraversion and Agree-
ableness can predict specific behavioral choices in a
social dilemma context. This is important because most
of the work on interpersonal dispositions has either
focused on highly contextualized behavioral measures
(e.g., Messick & McClintock, 1968) or on the structure
of interpersonal personality traits (e.g., McCrae &
Costa, 1989). By relating individual differences in
Extraversion and Agreeableness to interpersonal
behavior, the present research enhances the
nomological network surrounding the structural model
of Extraversion-Agreeableness. Moreover, the link
between Extraversion-Agreeableness and cooperative
behavior suggests that general structural representa-
tions in personality can be related to behavioral adapta-
tions to the social environment. This bolsters theorizing
about global personality differences as evolved strategies
for solving adaptive problems associated with social
exchange (Buss, 1997; Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997;
Hogan, 1982). In so doing, the present research counters
previous criticisms that the Extraversion-Agreeableness
framework is a purely psychometric invention (Eysenck,
1992) or no more than an artifact of everyday discourse
about persons (Semin & Chassein, 1985).
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Figure 1 Estimated resource use per trial as a function of
Extraversion and feedback about resource use.
Figure 2 Estimated resource use per trial as a function of Agree-
ableness and feedback about resource use.
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Individuals high on Extraversion and individuals low
on Agreeableness appeared mainly interested in harvest-
ing as much as they could from the collective resource.
By contrast, individuals low on Extraversion and individ-
uals high on Agreeableness seemed to use a behavioral
strategy that was considerably more complex. The latter
individuals reciprocated other group members’ level of
cooperation when the threat to collective resource was
low, showing high levels of cooperation in response to a
cooperative group and low levels of cooperation in
response to a noncooperative group. However, when the
collective resource became severely threatened, individ-
uals low on Extraversion and individuals high on Agree-
ableness dropped their resource dramatically. Thus,
individuals low on Extraversion and individuals high on
Agreeableness appeared highly responsive to both other
group members’ behavior and the degree to which the
collective resource was threatened. Overall, this pattern
is consistent with previous observations that coopera-
tively oriented individuals are more sensitive to situa-
tional contingencies than are noncooperatively oriented
individuals (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Kramer et al.,
1986; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988). We may speculate
that context sensitivity possesses greater adaptive value
among cooperatively oriented individuals. Cooperators
may have developed a greater sensitivity to cues relating
to interdependent others’ intentions to reduce their
own exploitability. In agreement with this, there is evi-
dence that cooperators are more strongly affected by
information about a partner’s honesty (Van Lange &
Kuhlman, 1994).
At a more general level, the obtained Person × Situa-
tion interactions confirm that “humans are strategic
problem-solvers, whose evolved psychological mecha-
nisms are at least somewhat domain-specific and whose
behavioral products are highly dependent on eliciting
context” (Buss, 1997, p. 326). More simply put, it
appears that a social dilemma setting may trigger differ-
ent reactions under different circumstances among dif-
ferent individuals. The situated nature of the influence
of personality on cooperation fits well with conceptions
of personality differences as strategic psychological
mechanisms (Buss, 1997; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990; see
also Bargh, 1990). This conception may be contrasted
with alternative views of traits as fixed, nonconditional
patterns of personality (see McAdams, 1995). The current
perspective moves beyond previous person/situation
dichotomies by posing that although personality is sta-
ble, people’s behavior may vary. As Hogan (1982) put it,
“In order to be consistent, people must change their
actions when they deal with other people” (p. 85).
It is noteworthy that the dimensions of Extraversion
and Agreeableness emerged as two independent predic-
tors of cooperative behavior. First, Extraversion and
Agreeableness were successfully orthogonalized
through factor-analytic procedures. In addition, we ana-
lyzed the influence of each dimension while statistically
controlling for the influence of the other dimension.
Nevertheless, the current findings showed the effects of
these dimensions to be almost each other’s mirror
image. Consequently, one might wonder whether the
two dimensions are really driven by a single psychologi-
cal process. The available literature seems to suggest
otherwise. Individual differences in Extraversion have
been related to a motivation to avoid interpersonal com-
petition (Graziano et al., 1985; Norman & Watson,
1976). For instance, Graziano et al. (1985) has suggested
that introverts display an aversion toward competitive sit-
uations because such encounters create aversive arousal
for them. In contrast, individual differences in Agree-
ableness have been related to a motivation to approach
interpersonal cooperation (Buss, 1991b; Digman &
Takemoto-Chock, 1981; Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997).
For instance, Graziano et al. (1996) proposed that
“‘agreeable people may be more highly motivated to
maintain positive relations with other people’” (p. 821).
Thus, although more work is needed in this area, the
available evidence suggests that Extraversion and Agree-
ableness are distinct psychological systems in the regula-
tion of interpersonal behavior.
LIMITATIONS AND
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Although the present research was successful in dem-
onstrating the influence of Extraversion and Agreeable-
ness on cooperative behavior, the processes that mediate
this relationship are still not completely understood. As
mentioned earlier, some investigators have suggested
that individuals low in Extraversion may be averse to
interpersonal competition because they are more sensi-
tive to the arousal and threat of punishment that accom-
pany interpersonal competition than are individuals
high in Extraversion (Graziano et al., 1985; Norman &
Watson, 1976; see also Eysenck, 1967; Gray, 1972). Thus,
individuals low in Extraversion’s avoidance of arousal
may lead to behavioral avoidance of conflict, leading in
turn to more cooperation in interdependent situations.
Future research may explore the mediational role of
arousal by obtaining measurements of arousal during a
social dilemma simulation and relating these to
Extraversion and cooperative behavior. In addition,
threat of punishment may be manipulated in alternative
ways. For instance, framing a social dilemma in terms of
losses (e.g., Brewer & Kramer, 1986; McCusker &
Carnevale, 1995) may decrease the level of cooperation
by individuals low in Extraversion if their cooperative-
ness is indeed motivated by a need to avoid negative
outcomes.
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Agreeableness differences have been related to
motives to interact harmoniously with other persons
(Buss, 1991b; Digman & Takemoto-Chock, 1981;
Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997; Graziano et al., 1997). For
example, Graziano and Eisenberg (1997) have sug-
gested that individuals high on Agreeableness may be
more disposed toward cooperation because they possess
a greater capacity for empathic emotion than do individ-
uals low on Agreeableness. In addition, Graziano et al.
(1997) proposed that Agreeableness differences may
affect behavior by affecting the individual’s choices for
specific strategies in interpersonal situations. General
measures of Agreeableness may thus be combined with
more specific personality variables to obtain both a gen-
eral understanding of the relationship between person-
ality and interpersonal behavior and a more fine-grained
understanding of the influence of personality in specific
situations (McAdams, 1995; for illustrations of this
approach, see Caldwell & Burger, 1997; Graziano et al.,
1997).
Another important issue concerns the question of
how personality traits that lie outside of the Extraversion-
Agreeableness framework may affect cooperation. As
mentioned earlier, factor-analytic studies have yielded
evidence for at least three other universal personality
dimensions: Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and
Intellect. The present research failed to uncover any sys-
tematic relations between cooperative behavior and
these three dimensions, but the conclusion is not war-
ranted that Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and
Intellect may never affect interpersonal cooperation.
Indeed, it remains possible that Conscientiousness,
Emotional Stability, and Intellect affect interpersonal
behavior through different mechanisms than the ones
studied in the present research. For instance, Conscien-
tiousness, Emotional Stability, and Intellect may influ-
ence cooperative behavior indirectly by affecting the
selection (e.g., Buss, 1987; Emmons & Diener, 1986) or
the manipulation of the interaction context (e.g., Buss,
1987, 1992; Caldwell & Burger, 1997).
Finally, the social dilemma paradigm used in this
research may offer a useful tool for addressing a classic
issue in personality research: that of comparing self- and
peer-ratings of personality (Funder, 1995; Funder &
Colvin, 1997; Hofstee, 1994; John & Robins, 1993;
Moskowitz, 1990). From a psychoevolutionary perspec-
tive, it seems probable that people have developed cog-
nitive mechanisms to detect stable individual differences
in cooperative tendencies (Borkenau, 1990; Buss, 1997;
Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997; Hogan, 1982). Consistent
with this, the present research found that the effects of
self-rated Extraversion and Agreeableness on coopera-
tive behavior were largely replicated in peer-ratings of
Extraversion and Agreeableness (see Note 2). By system-
atically comparing the predictive validity of self- and
peer-ratings of personality in social dilemmas, research-
ers may attain greater insight into the factors that under-
lie personality judgments in interdependent settings.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Social groups offer many advantages to their individ-
ual members, including the possibility of joining
resources to achieve higher outcomes. However, the col-
lective interests of a social group are sometimes at odds
with the interests of its individual members. Previous
research on social dilemmas has illuminated the pro-
cesses that determine whether people choose to serve
their own immediate self-interests or make personal sac-
rifices for the common good (Komorita & Parks, 1995;
Messick & Brewer, 1983; Van Lange et al., 1993). The
present research adds to these findings that individual
differences in Extraversion and Agreeableness are able
to explain substantial variations in cooperative behavior,
especially when conflict between individual and collec-
tive interests is high. In this way, personality and social
behavior were shown to be inextricably linked.
NOTES
1. This is not to say, of course, that this taxonomic approach has
remained without its critics. However, most critiques have centered on
the five-factor model of personality (Block, 1995; Eysenck, 1992;
McAdams, 1992). Because the two-dimensional framework of
Extraversion and Agreeableness is only based in part on the five-factor
model, many of the objections raised against the five-factor model do
not apply to the Extraversion-Agreeableness framework.
2. We also collected peer ratings of personality, which were pro-
vided by two to four judges per participant. These judges were persons
who knew the participants well, were not students in psychology them-
selves, and were living at different addresses from the participants. As
in previous research (e.g., John & Robins, 1993), there was substantial
agreement between self and peers on ratings of Extraversion, r(72) =
.82, p < .0001, and on ratings of Agreeableness, r(72) = .66, p < .001.
When peer ratings of Extraversion and Agreeableness were substituted
in supplementary analyses, results were comparable with those
obtained for self-ratings. Interested readers may contact the first
author for more details.
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